Imagined communities: How the print media’s framing of migration helps strengthen nationalism in the UK

Introduction 

In a post-Brexit United Kingdom, with a looming General Election and an increasingly unpopular Conservative government, the issue of mass migration continues to feature heavily in British media, while dominating political discussions. Through the frames of securitisation and ‘us vs them’, not only are migrants portrayed unfavourably and othered by the press, but a sense of British identity is strengthened at their expense. Drawing on Benedict Anderson’s theory of ‘imagined communities’, this essay will demonstrate how the print media’s portrayals of mass migration is heavily influential in contributing towards sentiments of British nationalism, conjoining beliefs around what it means to be British with opinions on migration. By focusing on the last decade – a period of political turmoil, evolving conversations on migration and a rise in the numbers of people migrating – we will see that Anderson’s theory overcomes criticisms around globalisation and a changing media landscape, remaining as salient as ever.

Imagined communities

In his influential 1983 book, ‘Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism’, Anderson introduces the concept of an ‘imagined community’, exploring the relationship between media and nationalism, with a focus on how the former shapes interactions and social structures that create the latter. Not only is the book the most cited study of nationalism of all time,¹ but it was also considered to be a groundbreaking exploration of nationalism, which the political scientist Ian Lustick describes as ‘the greatest, the most powerful single force in the modern world’.² As will be expanded upon below, central to Anderson’s theory are themes of political community, fraternity and print culture.

Anderson defines the modern nation as a socially-constructed community, imagined by people who perceive themselves as part of a group. Fundamental to this is the idea of political identity, where people are aware of their membership, subsequently forming a shared political community. The introduction to Anderson’s book clarifies that the nation is imagined because ‘the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’.³ For Anderson, the nation is both real and powerful – it is only ‘imagined’ in the sense that it is conceived by its members, as an embodiment of comradeship. Ultimately it is this powerful force of fraternity that has made it possible, throughout the history of the modern nation, ‘for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings’.⁴

With an emphasis specifically on print media – and what he calls ‘print-capitalism’ – Anderson then highlights how written language was integral in creating this sense of camaraderie. For Anderson, print media ‘made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways’.⁵ Through the development of technologies such as printing and the mass production of materials like books and newspapers, print-language enabled the ‘imagined community’ to spread out ‘to every conceivable contemporary society’.⁶

In other words, the growth of simple means of communication and shared languages was accelerated through the rise of the printing press, facilitating mobility across different social boundaries like class, subsequently resulting in the birth of national consciousness. As the political scientist David Held explains, this narrative of nationhood and the creation of a political community are maintained, in part, because ‘an institutional structure exists[…] which protects and represents the community, acts on its behalf and promotes the collective interest’.⁷

As will be explored below, it is through this lens of nationhood and the imagined community that the previous decade’s discourses on migration can be viewed and understood, in addition to the media’s influence on British nationalism.

Case study: British media on mass migration

A recent Daily Mail front page – one of the UK’s most-read newspapers – exclaimed, ‘Biggest ever clampdown ‘will slash migration by 300,000’’.⁸ The standfirst read, ‘James Cleverly last night vowed ‘enough is enough’ as he unveiled tough reforms designed to slash net migration by 300,000 a year’.⁹ Similarly sensationalist coverage – and toxic rhetoric from the government – is not unprecedented. Bolstered by debates around the referendum on Britain’s withdrawal from the EU, and the European refugee ‘crisis’ that followed the Syrian civil war, the last decade has seen a drastic increase in fear-mongering around mass migration.

In her analysis of media coverage during the European migration ‘crisis’, Dina Matar points to how, overtime, within the British media ‘the securitisation frame became more dominant, with migration talked about as “uncontrolled” and as a security threat and the migrants as a burden to British society’.¹⁰ Similarly, analysis of media reporting on migration in 2015 found that unfavourable messaging on migration significantly outweighed favourable messages.¹¹ In fact, among the research’s 13 selected countries, the UK (alongside the Netherlands) experienced the highest proportion of unfavourable coverage on immigration and immigrants.¹²

Nigel Farage – a highly controversial and influential figure in the media, especially during the Vote Leave campaign in 2016 – previously said that immigration had made Britain ‘unrecognisable’ and turned parts of the country into something ‘like a foreign land’.¹³ Such sentiments are not limited to polarising voices though – antagonism towards migrants is normalised and made rife across the media. Analysis from The Migration Observatory shows a recent increase in discourse about ‘illegal’ immigrants, with migrants periodically blamed for problems such as crime.¹⁴ Over the last decade there has also been a significant decline in discussions around the legal status of migrants and an increase in attention placed towards the scale of migration, implying that the UK is losing its identity. This shift in the media was accompanied by the industry’s heightened focus on discussions that are framed in terms of ‘limiting’ or ‘controlling’ migration¹⁵ – frames that paint a picture of mass migration as being undesirable and threatening to the UK.

Media, migration and nationalism

It is well-documented that the media is an incredibly powerful industry – a magnitude of research points to how mass media can meaningfully influence attitudes and public opinion.¹⁶ As Anderson theorised, the powerful structures of print-media can have wide-reaching impacts. This is no different in the context of migration. We will see below that against the antagonistic media landscape demonstrated above, the public’s attitudes towards migrants are shaped, which in turn influences our sense of national identity.

The significance of migration’s role in relation to the imagined community is twofold. Firstly, migration – the flow of labour, culture and ideas – is often perceived as a threat to existing identities. Through a globalised world – inherent within it the pluralisation of philosophies and cultures – the state’s ability to control narratives such as nationhood is threatened. Secondly – as this essay will argue – the migrant (or the ‘other’) provides a supposedly inferior image to which we can compare ourselves. Through negative portrayals of migrants, emotive responses are elicited, shaping views around what it means to be British and not belonging to ‘them’.

Particularly at times of crisis, or elections,¹⁷ media outlets use much more hyperbolic and exclusionary language, designed to generate a distinct sense of ‘them’ and ‘us’,¹⁸ influencing our perceptions of migrants and the extent to which they should be accepted into our imagined community. These narratives of creating divisions and ‘othering’ migrants are also noted by Matar who cites research that shows how much unfavourable attitudes are held towards migrants, as well as acceptance among the general public that the media is responsible for reinforcing negative stereotypes of migrants.¹⁹ The media’s repetition of divisive terms evoke largely damaging views about migrants, harming prospects of integration, while emphasising differences along racial, ethnic or religious lines.²⁰ However, not only do unfavourable and bigoted depictions of migrants create negative attitudes, they are also crucial in strengthening the concept of Britain as an imagined community. Through these narratives and portrayals of migrants – as a literal and metaphorical threat to Britain – a dominant vision of Britain is created. In other words, the identity of Britain as a nation and of what it means for its members to be British, to belong to this community, become at least in part contingent upon the media’s conceptualisation of migrants as outsiders.

The ‘us vs them’ frame perpetuated in print media can also be maintained through a contrasting image of generosity towards migrants. For instance, most recently in its communications around irregular migration and asylum law, the government has repeatedly pointed towards the UK’s history of tolerance towards refugees – and how this forms a part of British identity. In its press release for the announcement of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 – as reported by outlets such as Reuters and The Independent – there was clear reference to how ‘the UK will always be a compassionate country, as demonstrated by the nation opening its hearts and homes to those from [sic] fleeing from Afghanistan and Ukraine’.²¹ In this case, ‘good immigrants’ or ‘deserving refugees’ are welcomed into the country, because of our benevolence as Brits. 

As well as references to historic generosity towards migrants, analysis has shown that the British media used largely positive characteristics to describe Ukrainian refugees in the aftermath of the Russian invasion.²² This partially stemmed from the belief among British journalists that Ukrainians share cultural similarities (or identities) with the Western countries to which they are fleeing,²³ existing within the ‘us’ group rather than ‘them’. The analysis also showed that the positive depictions were partly due to journalists’ belief that refugees do not have the desire to reside in host countries permanently²⁴ and thus do not threaten national identity.

Nonetheless, the prevailing narrative in print media is one that contrasts what it means to be British with the imminent threat of outsiders, as well as a desire to protect British identity. Within the context of Brexit, research looking at immigration and identity – from the lens of securitisation – found that the British ‘cosmopolitan elite’ were depicted in the media as being supportive of their European identity and of multiculturalism, in contrast to supporters of the Leave campaign who identified themselves by their English or British identity.²⁵ Echoing Matar’s above findings, media reporting in the past decade was often framed in a national security context²⁶ – the relevance being that not only does this frame strengthen sentiments of ‘taking back control’ and a rejection of outsiders, but it compounds negative attitudes towards migrants, creating divisions that strengthen a sense of British identity (contrasted against migrants, or ‘them’).

One study examining the relationship between the way people think about identity and their attitudes towards ‘the world beyond the UK’s borders’ reached similar conclusions. Respondents who think that being British is dependent on a mixture of ‘civic’ factors (which can be acquired, such as speaking English) and ‘ethnic’ factors (which are determined early in life or through descent, like your place of birth) were the most likely group to oppose immigration and to desire weaker ties between Britain and the EU.²⁷ In contrast, people who think only civic factors matter in determining Britishness were less likely to be critical of mass migration. The research concluded that there is a ‘close link between people’s views about immigration and what they think matters when it comes to being “truly British”’.²⁸

In a paper that similarly explores notions of nationality and immigration, the authors found that people who think of themselves as ‘English’ are not only more likely to be in favour of leaving the EU than those who identify as ‘British’, but they are more likely to view ancestry as the main criterion for classifying who ‘belongs’ to the UK.²⁹ For those who self-identify with an ethnic form of national identity, migrants are viewed as an outgroup, as at odds with Britain as an imagined community. 

Ultimately, through the British media’s antagonistic depictions of migrants, unfavourable attitudes towards these ‘outsiders’ are strengthened and juxtaposed against what many people conceive as signifiers of Britishness.

The emergence of globalisation

A common criticism of Anderson’s theory of imagined communities is that it has lost its pertinence in a globalised world. Anderson writes in great length about the creation of modern nations and their existence as singular communities, to the detriment of a focus on global flows or permeance between national identities. In an era of transnationalism, where borders are becoming less defined, critics ask, ‘Is the nation dead?’. David Held describes this critique as the ‘hollowing out’ of states, where their sovereignty and autonomy are eroded.³⁰ This question is perhaps even more salient in the context of migration where increases in the number of people moving between nations has weakened the existence of a singular culture or identity.

Indeed, as shown above, migration has often been framed as a threat to the notion of identity and fraternity – as perpetuated by mass media – but the belief that the nation is now obsolete is exaggerated. Globalisation is undoubtedly impacting borders and identities, but it has not usurped nationalism. Arguably, some communities’ response to globalisation has made nationalistic sentiments stronger than before. As social movements push back against the dominance of global powers and the elite, we have also seen a rise in nationalist and populist politics, across the Global North particularly.³¹ While globalisation has led to the sharing of culture across borders, it has not created a single, universal sense of identity or belonging as defined by Anderson. These identities are still drawn along nations and borders. Using the case study of migration, we can point to how mass migration is a key policy for most countries across the world – with predominantly negative attitudes held towards migrants globally – and yet the topic remains one specifically of national-interest. While many countries equally grapple with mass and irregular migration, seldom are these issues talked about as a global problem. In the UK, for example, despite the significance of France and the Channel in facilitating the arrival of irregular migrants, the issue of migration is discussed in terms of a British failure to control borders, and in terms of the significance to British identity, not through the lens of this being a shared struggle with France. In the ‘us vs them’ dichotomy, only Britain constitutes ‘us’, not other countries too.

Dominant narratives and agency

Another contemporary criticism of Anderson’s theory is that although historically media systems were integral to nation-building, the emergence of new media has facilitated more power to the individual, thus also eroding the significance of communities or nationalism. Spaces that were once dominated by a single narrative from the media are now being weakened by users who are creating their own discourses. The reach and power of media structures are no longer as powerful as Anderson once described. In his book, Anderson placed great significance on print-capitalism – as opposed to oral culture for example – because of its hegemonic influence and top-down power structure. Critics contend, however, that he placed too much emphasis on media structures, failing to give importance to the diversity of political communities that individuals can experience. 

However, under this essay’s interpretation of Anderson’s work, his theory does not entirely disregard more democratised forms of communication – it simply spotlights print-capitalism and the strong impact of a centralised and standardised form of communication. These structures and the content created through them are not made in a vacuum, abject of subaltern narratives. Individuals do possess powers that allow them to influence the media or to form their own diverging opinions, but this nonetheless does not undermine or supersede the power that print media possesses in shaping attitudes and nationhood. Anderson does not claim that print-capitalism is the sole influencer of nationalism, nor that the media necessitates nationalism – and it is possible for minority and divergent views to exist in a landscape that has been demonstrated to still be dominated by mass media. Within the case study of migration, it is also clear that a variety of discourses on social media and other channels exist, and yet this does not nonetheless negate the fact that print media still remains as a leading force in setting the agenda and influencing how we conceive Britishness.

Conclusion 

Anderson’s theory of ‘imagined communities’ argues that, through print media, sentiments of fraternity and shared political communities are created and sustained. These structures and their content subsequently help stoke up sentiments of nationalism. As this essay has demonstrated through the lens of migration, Anderson’s theory remains highly relevant today. We have seen how particularly over the past decade in the UK, discourses around mass migration in print media have had a sizeable impact in producing unfavourable opinions towards migrants. Portrayals of this marginalised group – for example as criminals or as a threat to the UK – are contrasted with the ‘us’ group and utilised to maintain ideas around British identity.

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¹ Michael Skey. “Nationalism and Media,” Nationalities Papers 50 (5) (2022): 840.

² Ian S. Lustwick. “Hegemony and the Riddle of Nationalism: The Dialectics of Nationalism and Religion in the Middle East,” Logos: A Journal of Modern Society and Culture 1 (3) (2002): 18.

³ Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), 6.

⁴ Ibid., 7

⁵ Ibid., 36

⁶ Ibid., 157

⁷ David Held. “National Culture, the Globalization of Communications and the Bounded Political Community,” Logos: A Journal of Modern Society and Culture 1 (3) (2002): 5.

⁸ Paperboy, “Front pages today,” December 5, 2023, https://www.thepaperboy.com/uk/daily-mail/front-pages-today.cfm?frontpage=72925.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Dina Matar. “Media Coverage of the Migration Crisis in Europe: a Confused and Polarized Narrative,” EMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2017 (2017): 294.

¹¹ Marie Mcauliffe et al, “Media and migration: Comparative analysis of print and online media reporting on migrants and migration in selected countries,” in A Long Way to Go, eds. Marie Mcauliffe and Khalid Koser (ANU Press 2017) 286.

¹² Ibid., 292

¹³ Andrew Sparrow, “Nigel Farage: parts of Britain are 'like a foreign land',” The Guardian, February 28, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/feb/28/nigel-farage-ukip-immigration-speech.

¹⁴ William L Allen, “A Decade of Immigration in the British Press,” The Migration Observatory, November 7, 2016, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Report-Decade_Immigration_British_Press-1.pdf.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Robert M. Entman. “How the Media Affect What People Think: An Information Processing Approach,” The Journal of Politics 51 (2) (1989): 347.

¹⁷ Mcauliffe et al, "Media and migration," 285.

¹⁸ Skey, “Nationalism and Media,” 841.

¹⁹ European Commission, “Migrant Integration. Aggregate Report,” May 2011, https://www.ikuspegi.eus/documentos/documentos_externos/ql_5969_migrant_en.pdf

²⁰ Matar, “Media Coverage of the Migration Crisis,” 293.

²¹ Home Office, “Ground-breaking new laws to stop the boats,” Gov.uk, March 7, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ground-breaking-new-laws-to-stop-the-boats.

²² Rahul Sambaraju. “‘All of a sudden for no reason they've been displaced’: Constructing the ‘contingent refugee’ in early media reports on the Ukrainian refugees,” British Journal of Social Psychology 62 (4) (2023): 1715.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Preetha Mitra. “Immigration, Identity and Security in the Context of Brexit: Examining Linkages Through the Lens of the Copenhagen School,” Jadavpur Journal of International Relation 26 (1) (2002): 48.

²⁶ Mcauliffe et al, "Media and migration," 286. 

²⁷NatCen Social Research, “British Social Attitudes 31 | National identity,” June 17, 2014, https://natcen.ac.uk/publications/british-social-attitudes-31.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Peter Howley and Muhammad Waqas. “Identity, immigration, and subjective well-being: why are natives so sharply divided on immigration issues?” Oxford Economic Papers (2022): 16.

³⁰ Held, “National Culture, the Globalization of Communications,” 3.

³¹ BBC News, “Europe and right-wing nationalism: A country-by-country guide,” November 13, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36130006.